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SUPREME COURT REVIEW
FOREWORD: THE UMITS OF THE
PREVENTIVE STATE
CAROL S. STEIKER

I. PUNISHMENT VS. PREVENTION

Our federal Constitution has a lot to say about crime and
punishment. Even in the "structural" part of the Constitution,
which is not often thought to be the source of much criminal
regulation, references to criminal law and criminal procedure
abound. For example, the drafters took care to enumerate the
crimes for which federal officials are subject to impeachment
and removal from office' and for which federal law-makers are
exempt from arrest during Congressional sessions.2 And they
specifically provided for Congress' power to punish the crimes
of counterfeiting,3 treason,4 piracy,5 and violations of "the Law of
Nations., 6 Moreover, entire species of penal laws-bills of at-

tainder and ex post facto laws-are placed by the Constitution

. Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. I thank Marty Lederman, Jordan Steiker
and participants in the Harvard Law School Summer Research Program for helpful
comments and discussions.
'See U.S. CoNsT. art. H, § 4 (stating that federal officials may be impeached and
removed from office for the crimes of "Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and
Misdemeanors").
2 See id. at art. I, § 6, cI. 1 (stating that Senators and Representatives are privileged
from arrest during law-making sessions for all crimes "except Treason, Felony and
Breach of the Peace").
'See id.at art. I, § 8, cl. 6.
See id. at art. IlI, § 3, cl. 2.
See id. at art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
6See id.
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outside of the reach of both state and federal legislators. And
certain procedures are required not only for treason trials,8 but
also for criminal trials more generally-in particular, trial by
jury9 and the availability of the writ of habeas corpus in peacetime.' °
The Bill of Rights more famously and in more detail occupies itself with both substantive and procedural criminal law.
The Eighth Amendment's proscription of "excessive bail," "excessive fines," and "cruel and unusual punishments" has been
interpreted by the Supreme Court to limit both federal and
state officials in their legislative and judicial capacities.
The
Fifth Amendment's repudiation of double jeopardy can also be
read as a substantive limit on the government's power to punish.1 2 Moreover, the Fifth and Sixth Amendments speak directly
and in significant detail about the procedures necessary in
"criminal case [s]"

13

and "criminal prosecutions, '4 requiring,

among other things, grand jury indictments," the privilege
against self-incrimination, speedy trials, impartial juries, confrontation of witnesses by the accused, compulsory process for
the accused, and the assistance of counsel for the defense. And
the "due process" clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments has been held to require even more in the way of proceSee id. at art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (state legislators); itL at art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (Congress).
See id. at art. III, § 3, cl. 1.
'See id. at art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
'0See id. at art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
" See id.
at amend. VIII; Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 365 (1971) (stating that the
"excessive bail" clause "has been assumed" to apply to the states); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962) (applying the Eighth Amendment's "cruel and
unusual" punishment clause to a state statute). While the Supreme Court has not yet
had occasion to rule that the "excessive fines" clause likewise applies to the states,
agreement "appears universal" that the Court will do so. See NancyJ. King, Portioning
Punishment: ConstitutionalLimits on Successive and Excessive Penalties, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
101, 155 n.155 (1995) (citing sources).
12 See generally King, supra note 11, at 104-05 (arguing for such an interpretation
of
the Double Jeopardy Clause in conjunction with the Due Process Clause and the
Eighth Amendment).
"U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
Id. at amend. VI.
But only for federal prosecutions. See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884)
(refusing to apply the grand jury clause to state prosecutions).
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dural protections in criminal cases, most notably the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt for conviction.16 Finally, the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of "unreasonable
searches and seizures," while not on its face limited to criminal
cases, has been elucidated extensively-indeed, virtually exclusively-in the realm of the regulation of police practices in
criminal cases.
The Supreme Court, the lower federal courts, and state
courts of all levels have elaborated extensively on the meaning
of most of these constitutional proscriptions and requirements
in the thirty-plus years since the Warren Court's criminal procedure "revolution," when most of the provisions of the Bill of
Rights relating to criminal investigation and prosecution were
made applicable to the states. ' 8 As a result, the constitutional
regulation of the criminal process has become its own legal subspecialty, with its own courses, casebooks, treatises, and experts.
It is taken for granted, both in the legal academy and in the
wider world of legal institutions, that the constitutional problems posed by the creation and enforcement of criminal laws
are distinct and distinctively important. To coin a phrase, the
limits of "the punitive state"' 9 have been explored extensively (if
not resolved successfully) both by courts and legal commentators.
6 See U.S.

CONsT. amend. V; id. at amend. XIV; In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364

(1970).
7This focus is largely due to.the incorporation of the exclusionary
rule, see Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), which has created an incentive for Fourth Amendment
litigation by criminal defendants in every plausible case. Moreover, as Bill Stuntz has
noted, the conceptual focus on privacy as the Fourth Amendment's central organizing value has proven to have limited bite in non-criminal cases, given the inescapable
rise of the regulatory state since the New Deal. See William J. Stuntz, Privacy'sProblem
and the Law of CriminalProcedure,93 MICH. L. REV. 1016, 1018-19 (1995).
,"See generally Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure? Two Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. REv. 2466 (1996) (describing and
evaluating the evolution of constitutional criminal procedure from the 1960s to the
1990s).
" It might not be obvious in this context that by "state" I mean not one of the fifty
states in our federal system, but more generally any sovereign governmental power.
See WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLiEGIATE DIGnIONARY 1151 (1990) (contrasting "a politically organized body of people ...; esp.: one that is sovereign" with "one of the constituent units of a nation having a federal government").
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In contrast, courts and commentators have had much less to
say about the related topic of the limits of the state not as punisher (and thus, necessarily as investigator and adjudicator of
criminal acts) but rather as preventer of crime and disorder
generally. Indeed, courts and commentators have not yet even
recognized this topic as a distinct phenomenon either doctrinally or conceptually. Of course, one way to prevent crime is to
punish criminals, thereby incapacitating (and perhaps even rehabilitating) them during the period of their incarceration, deterring the specific individuals involved from further
criminality, and deterring others by example. But punishment
is not the only, the most common, or the most effective means
of crime prevention. The state can also attempt to identify and
neutralize dangerous individuals before they commit crimes by
restricting their liberty in a variety of ways. In pursuing this
goal, the state often will expand the functions of the institutions
primarily involved in the criminal justice system-namely, the
police and the prison. But other analogous institutions, such
the juvenile justice system 20 and the civil commitment process,
are also sometimes tools of, to coin another phrase, the "preventive state."
The preventive state is all the rage these days, and it can be
seen in many different guises. One set of prophylactic measures
involves giving the police more authority to intervene earlier to
prevent, as opposed to merely detect and investigate, crime.
For example, "community policing" initiatives are sweeping the
country's urban police departments, and one thing that these
often divergent policies seem to have in common is enhancing
the preventive role of police officers. 2' Localities are also seeking to give the police broader preventive authority by enacting

20A typical juvenile justice system consists of at least three different sorts of state
intervention: intervention to deal with children who are abused or neglected by their
parents or guardians; intervention to deal with children who are at risk because of
behaviors like truancy or running away (in which case the children are deemed "in
need of supervision" or "in need of services"); and intervention to deal with children
who have committed delinquent acts (acts which would be crimes if committed by
adults). See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 119, §§ 21, 39E, 51B, 52, 58 (1998).
2 See Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts,
Communities, and the New Policing,97 CoLUM. L. Rav. 551, 576 (1997).
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new substantive offenses such as "drug loitering" or "gang loitering.
The federal government has enhanced federal law enforcement's preventive power by reviving and expanding the
practice of civil forfeiture based only upon "probable cause. 23
And the Supreme Court has authorized several important aspects of preventive policing under the Fourth Amendment. For
example, the Court has extended its holding that a limited Terry
"stop-and-frisk" of a person is justified without probable cause in
order to prevent harm to police officers to legitimize similar
prophylactic "frisks" of cars24 and even houses.2" And the Court
has added significantly to the (formerly) short list of searches
and seizures that may be done without any individualized suspicion whatsoever.26
Another set of prophylactic measures involves direct restraints by legislatures on the liberty of certain individuals believed to be particularly dangerous. For example, pre-trial
preventive detention of both juveniles and adults has become
much more common in recent years.27 Many states are seeking
2 See, e.g., Chicago v. Morales, 687 N.E.2d 53 (Ill. 1997), cert. granted, 66 U.S.L.W.
3686 (U.S. Apr. 21, 1998) (No. 97-1121) (granting certiorari to decide the constitutionality of a municipal ordinance permitting the police to order groups in public
places to disband if the police officer reasonable believes that the group contains at
least one gang member); City of Akron v. Rowland, 618 N.E.2d 138, 148 (Ohio 1993)
(striking down a municipal ordinance prohibiting loitering "under circumstances
manifesting the purpose to engage in drug-related activity" as unconstitutionally
vague).
See generally Mary M. Cheh, Can Something This Easy, Quick, and Profitable Also Be
Fair?: Runaway Civil Forfeiture Stumbles on the Constitution, 39 N.Y.L. SCR. L. REV. 1
(1994) (describing and critiquing the recent explosion in both federal and state civil
forfeiture law).
2' See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983) (extending Teny frisk to passenger
compartment of automobile).
' See Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990) (approving limited protective sweep of
house).
' See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) (permitting suspicionless drug testing of high school athletes); Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496
U.S. 444 (1990) (permitting suspicionless stopping and questioning of motorists at
sobriety checkpoints); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602
(1989) (permitting suspicionless drug and alcohol testing of certain railroad employees).
2 See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) (upholding the preventive
detention provisions of the federal Bail Reform Act of 1984); Schall v. Martin, 467
U.S. 253 (1984) (upholding the preventive detention provisions of the New York Family Court Act).

CAROL S. STEIKER

[Vol. 88

to prevent sexual assaults, particularly those against children, by
enacting sex offender registration and/or community notificadon statutes"' and by creating or reviving "sexually violent
predator" statutes that permit the indefinite civil commitment
of convicted sex offenders who would otherwise be released at
the end of their prison terms.2
This diverse set of preventive practices and policies has created (or at least exacerbated) two important legal problems,
one of which is beginning to get a lot of attention, and one of
which is hardly recognized at all. The problem currently attracting attention is the problem of identifying those preventive
practices and policies that are "really" criminal punishment and
thus subject to the range of constitutional constraints, both substantive and procedural, that delimit the use of the criminal
sanction. For example, must the civil forfeiture of property
used or acquired in the course of criminal behavior be "proportionate" in the way in which criminal punishment must be under the Eighth Amendment?30 If and when does the Double
Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment apply to separate civil
forfeiture and criminal proceedings, or to separate civil penalty and criminal proceedings? 32 Does the preventive detention
21 See, e.g., E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077 (3d Cir. 1997) (upholding the
community notification provisions of "Megan's Law" against constitutional challenge); Artway v. Attorney General of NewJersey, 81 F.3d 1235 (3d Cir.) (en banc) (upholding
the sex offender registration provisions of NewJersey's "Megan's Law" against constitutional attack), reh'gdenied, 83 F.3d 594 (3d Cir. 1996).
2 See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997) (upholding Kansas' "sexually violent predator" statute).
" See Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 622 (1993) (holding that the Eighth

Amendment requires proportionality of civil forfeitures, but leaving open the question as to what exactly the forfeitures must be proportionate).
" See United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267 (1996) (holding that the Double Jeop-

ardy Clause does not bar separate civil forfeiture and criminal proceedings premised
on the same underlying conduct).
32 CompareUnited States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 449-50 (1989) (holding that the
Double Jeopardy Clause bars later criminal proceedings when earlier civil penalties
are so disproportionate to the injury caused that they should be deemed punitive
rather than "remedial"), with Hudson v. United States, 118 S.Ct. 488 (1997) (overruling Halper and holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause bars later criminal proceedings only when earlier civil penalties should be considered "criminal" punishment
under the multi-factor test announced in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144
(1963)).
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of pre-trial detainees constitute criminal punishment without
trial in violation of the Due Process Clause?33 And does the indefinite civil commitment of "sexually violent predators" at the
conclusion of their prison terms constitute new punishment in
violation of the Ex Post Facto and Double Jeopardy provisions
of the Constitution? 4 More generally, should putatively civil
penalties and restraints be considered "really" criminal punishments based on the government's motivation, if one can be discerned? Or on the effect such penalties and restraints have on
the individual on whom they are imposed? Or on how the relevant community would understand the imposition of such penalties and restraints? Scholars as well as courts have begun to
engage these cases and questions, offering different theories of
how we might identify hidden but "real" criminal punishment
that must be subject to our constitutional constraints on "the
punitive state."3 5
The urgency and complexity of this first problem has
tended to obscure a second problem, which is also in need of
careful attention, but which has not yet been generally recognized as a problem. What constitutional and/or policy limits
are there on the non-punitive "preventive" state? Even if certain
policies and practices do not implicate the special substantive
and procedural constraints that we place on criminal punishment, they may well implicate other constitutional provisions
and/or policy concerns. This point is all too often lost. Courts
and commentators often tend to conclude, too quickly, that if
some policy or practice is not "really" punishment, then there is
nothing wrong with it. And they often treat preventive searches
and seizures as inherently far less problematic than those en" See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) (upholding the constitutional
validity of pretrial preventive detention under certain circumstances).
-" See Hendricks, 117 S.Ct. at 2072 (upholding the civil commitment of "sexually
violent predators" under certain circumstances).
I am myself one of the scholars who has recently engaged the problem of identifying which putatively civil penalties and restraints are "really" criminal punishment.
See Carol S. Steiker, Foreword: Punishment and Procedure: Punishment Theory and the
Criminal-CivilProceduralDivide, 85 GEO.J.L. 775 (1997) [hereinafter Steiker, Punishment and Procedure]. In addition to offering my own theory (of course), I canvass the
wide variety of cases that have recently raised this question, see id. at 778-80, and note
the burgeoning recent literature on the topic, see id. at 781 & nn.41-43.
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gaged in for the purposes of investigating and prosecuting
crime.
Not only do courts and commentators often trivialize objections to actions of a "merely" preventive (as opposed to punitive) state, they also do not tend to see the various preventive
policies and practices canvassed above as part of a unified problem. Instead, the cases and commentary on these issues have a
fragmented and haphazard quality. On the procedural side, the
legal issues posed by "preventive" policing have not generally
been seen as related to the larger category of preventive
searches and seizures by non-police entities in non-investigative
capacities. Thus, those writing about community policing initiatives have had little to say about, for example, random drug testing programs. And on the substantive side, few connections
have been made between the main categories of preventive restraints, such as pre-trial detention, civil commitment of the
dangerous mentally ill, and the incarceration of delinquent juveniles. Rather, each individual preventive practice has been
treated as sui generis rather than as a facet of a larger question in
need of a more general conceptual framework.
The neglect of this second problem-the problem of the
limits of the preventive state-is traceable, at least in part, to the
text and history of the Constitution. At the time of the drafting
and ratifying of the Constitution, the dangers of the punitive
state were well known. Thus, the Founders were careful to include in our foundational text the many references noted above
to particular criminal processes and protections in order to
cabin appropriately the punitive power of the new federal government. The preventive state became possible only as the next
36
century progressed, with the invention of modem police forces
and total institutions like the prison, the mental hospital, and
the home for juvenile delinquents.3 7 The growth of the regula' See Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARv. L REv. 820,
833 (1994)

[hereinafter Steiker, Second Thoughts] (describing the development of

modern police forces as "one of the 'major social inventions' of the nineteenth century") (quoting LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY
67 (1993)).
37 See Steiker, Punishment and Procedure,supra note 35, at 788 (describing "the great

period of prison and asylum building in the early nineteenth century...").
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tory state in the post-New Deal Twentieth Century further established the pervasive presence and knowledge of the state in
many guises, creating new opportunities for prophylactic state
action.! But as a matter of constitutional interpretation, most
of these new institutions and their powers could be cabined only
under the most general rubrics of the Constitution, like the
Fourth Amendment's proscription of "unreasonable" searches
and seizures and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments' Due
Process Clauses. Thus, it is harder to see the preventive state as
a category than it is to so view the punitive state.
Much, however, stands to be gained by recognizing the
connections among the various policies of the preventive state.
First, once it becomes explicit that there is a separate category
of restrictions on state actions, courts and commentators who
are alarmed about the use of certain state practices-such as,
for example, various forms of preventive detention-need no
longer try to frame their concerns only or primarily as concerns
about the punitive state. We can thus have freer and more productive analyses of what limits we should place, as a matter of
constitutional law or public policy, on the preventive state even
when it is not acting as criminal punisher. Second, the concerns that have been raised about certain preventive practices
may shed light on what may (or may not) be cause for concern
about other preventive practices. The circumstances in which
sex offender registration may be constitutionally permissible or
wise as a matter of policy might inform other preventive projects, such as the creation of DNA or fingerprint banks, which
may inform yet other preventive policing policies. Similarly, the
concerns raised about the detention of juvenile delinquents
share many salient similarities with the concerns raised about
other forms of preventive/rehabilitative detention, such as the
pre-trial detention of dangerous defendants, the detention of
the dangerous mentally ill, and the quarantine of the those with
dangerous communicable diseases. Moving up a level of conceptual generalization may well create new insights about particular practices. Finally, given the exceptionally particularized
" See Stuntz, supra note 17, at 1018-19 (describing the new information-gathering
attributes of the post-New Deal state).
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way in which the law has developed on these issues up to this
point, raising the level of conceptual generalization may well
create a greater degree of predictability for federal and state
policy-makers and for individuals concerned about their civil
liberties.
In order to demonstrate the need for a more general discussion of the limits of the preventive state and to suggest some
of the questions that any such discussion must address, I will examine two of the Supreme Court's cases of last Term (October
Term 1996)-decisions not thought to have much to do with
one another. The first, Kansas v. Hendricks,9 is a "substantive"
law case, which considered the constitutional validity of the
State of Kansas' "sexually violent predator" law permitting the
indefinite civil commitment of certain sex offenders after the
conclusion of their prison terms. The second, Chandler v.
Miller,0 is a "procedural" case, which considered the constitutionality of the State of Georgia's requirement that certain candidates for state office submit to urinalysis drug testing.1 In
each of these opinions the Supreme Court failed to conceive of
its decision in the case before it as part of the larger task of delimiting the powers of the preventive state. As a result, each of
these opinions is less illuminating and useful than it otherwise
might be. I will try to explain the ways in which the Court's
analysis in these cases is unsatisfying and to suggest some of the
questions that the Court might have asked had it formulated the
cases as I suggest. Providing good answers to these questions is

"117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997).
40117 S. Ct. 1295 (1997).
' I put "substantive" and "procedural" in quotes because these terms reflect the
standard division of constitutional provisions relating to criminal law. Substantive
limits on the state's power to enact criminal laws-such as the prohibition of ex post
facto laws and the void for vagueness doctrine-are typically conceived of, written
about, and taught separately from the procedural limits on the state's power to investigate and prosecute crime under the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments. But this
received distinction, like many such distinctions, is not entirely satisfactory. For example, there is a strong connection between the "substantive" void for vagueness doctrine and "procedural" limitations on discretionary police power under the Fourth
Amendment. Nonetheless, I will continue to refer to Hendricks and Chandler,respectively, as a "substantive" or "procedural" decision in order to recognize the way in
which they are generally considered to be separate and distinct.
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a much larger task which I hope to prod others to undertake
and to which I hope to return in the future.
II. KANSAS v. HENDPJCIm. THE SUBSTANTIVE LMrrs
OF THE PREVENTIVE STATE

The Supreme Court's upholding against constitutional challenge of Kansas' "sexually violent predator" statute was a highprofile decision with important implications for the nearly
twenty (by one Justice's count) other states with similar statutes
authorizing civil commitment or other mandatory treatment for
sexually dangerous persons. 42 The decision was-or should have
been-even more significant outside of the narrow, but burgeoning area of sex offender policy. The use of civil, nonpunitive confinement to incapacitate or treat (or both) dangerous persons has been a recurring constitutional question for
policy-makers and courts in the latter part of this century. From
the confinement of juveniles found to be delinquent, 43 to the
civil commitment of the dangerous mentally ill,44 to the pre-trial

detention of certain dangerous criminal defendants, 5 the
United States Supreme Court has grappled with defining the
limits of the state's ability to use what we have come to call "total
institutions" to deal prophylactically with dangerous deviance.46
Yet the Court's decisions rarely speak either to one another or
to the problem in generalized terms, and thus the boundaries of
the state's power in this important realm remain hazy and haphazard. The Hendricks case offered an important opportunity
for the Court to take stock and address this issue more globally,
but that opportunity was unfortunately squandered. Why and
how that opportunity was lost and what might have been done
instead are my topics here.
12See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2099 (Appendix of "Selected Sexual Offense Com-

mitment Statutes") (Breyer,J., dissenting).
4'See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
41SeeAddington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
" See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
46 See ERVING GOFFMAN, AsYLUMS xiii (1961) (describing a total institution as "a place
of residence and work where a large number of like-situated individuals, cut off from
the wider society for an appreciable period of time, together lead an enclosed, formally administered round of life.").
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The state statute at issue in Hendricks established procedures
for the civil commitment of persons who, after being "convicted
of or charged with a sexually violent offense," are found to suffer from a "mental abnormality" or "personality disorder" which
makes them "likely to engage" in "predatory acts of sexual violence."47 The Kansas Supreme Court invalidated the statute on
federal substantive due process grounds, holding that involuntary civil commitment must be predicated on a finding of "mental illness," which the statute did not specifically require.48 The
United States Supreme Court granted the state of Kansas' petition for certiorari, which disputed the Kansas Supreme Court's
due process analysis, as well as Hendricks' cross-petition, which
asserted additional federal constitutional challenges to the statute based on the Ex Post Facto and Double Jeopardy Clauses. 9
Justice Thomas wrote for a five-person majority, reversing
the decision of the Kansas Supreme Court and rejecting Hendricks' additional constitutional challenges that had not been
considered by the Kansas Court. Justice Thomas' majority opinion was devoted disproportionately to the issues raised by Hendricks' cross-petition-issues that together presented the
general question of whether Kansas' civil commitment of sexually violent predators actually constituted a form of criminal
punishment, which would clearly run afoul of both the Ex Post
Facto and the Double Jeopardy Clauses. After much lengthy
analysis about the statute's purpose and effect, Justice Thomas
rejected Hendricks' claims, concluding that Hendricks had
failed to provide "'the clearest proof' that 'the statutory scheme
effect as to negate [the
[is] so punitive either in purpose 5or
0
State's] intention' to deem it 'civil.'

The four dissenting Justices, who all joined an opinion by
Justice Breyer, dissented only on the issue of whether the statute, despite its putatively civil nature, actually imposed criminal
punishment (and thus ran afoul of the Constitutional Ex Post
47

§ 59-29a02(a) (1994).
re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129 (Kan. 1996).
'9 116 S. Ct. 2522 (1996).
'0 Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2082 (citing United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49
(1980)).
KAN. STAT. ANN.

'a See In
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Facto prohibition)." Justice Breyer concluded that the statute
did in fact amount to criminal punishment, primarily because
the Kansas legislature "did not tailor the statute to fit the nonpunitive civil aim of treatment, which it concedes exists in Hendricks' case."5 Justice Breyer was careful to avoid asserting that
treatment must always attend involuntary civil commitment;
rather, he argued more narrowly that if a state's putative purpose in employing civil commitment is treatment, and treatment is available, and the person civilly committed is treatable,
then the state's failure to provide such treatment at an appropriate time is convincing evidence that the state's actual purpose is to punish. 3
Justice Kennedy, while joining Justice Thomas' majority
opinion, also wrote a brief concurrence expressing sympathy
with the dissenters' cause, though not agreeing with their ultimate conclusion. 4 He, too, focussed his discussion on the punishment issue. While Justice Kennedy fully joined the majority's
analysis and rejection of Hendricks' ex post facto and double
jeopardy claims, he cautioned against the "dangers inherent
when a civil confinement law is used in conjunction with the
criminal process"55 and appeared to promise future vigilance
against attempts by states to use civil confinement as "a mechanism for retribution or general deterrence. 56
This disproportionate focus on the punishment issue is
symptomatic of the way in which the question of the limits of
the preventive state tends to become marginalized. It is often
recognized that because the Constitution so explicitly cabins the
"Justice Ginsburg, interestingly, did not join Part I of Justice Breyer's opinion,
which essentially concurred with the majority's treatment of the main substantive due
process holding of the Kansas Supreme Court. Id. at 2087. She did not, however,
write a separate opinion stating her views on the substantive due process issue.
12 Id. at 2098 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer also raised without purporting
to decide the question of whether Kansas' failure "to provide treatment that it concedes is potentially available to a person whom it concedes is treatable" could be
framed as a violation of substantive due process in addition to a violation of the ex
post facto clause. Id. at 2090 (Breyer,J., dissenting).
"Id. at 2096 (BreyerJ., dissenting).
4
1d.
I at 2087 (KennedyJ., concurring).
"Id. (Kennedy,J., concurring).
Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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use of the penal sanction, there is incentive for the state to
avoid these restrictions by turning to various civil restraints as alternative means of punishment. 7 But it is not often enough
recognized that because the Constitution so explicitly cabins the
use of the penal sanction, there is incentive for individuals subject to civil restraints to portray them as punitive, so as to invalidate or at least diminish them. Thus, the explicit quality of the
limitations on the punitive state creates skewed litigation incentives for the individuals who are the necessary sources of challenges to preventive state practices and policies. They stand to
win and win big if they can convince a court that the state is inflicting "punishment." It is much harder to attempt to make out
a substantive due process claim, especially in light of the paucity
of the Court's precedents in this area. Thus, litigants tend to try
to squeeze all of their objections to state practices into their argument that the practices are punitive. And courts and commentators tend to take their cue from litigants, judging from
the recent outpouring of cases and articles on the punishment
question 8 as compared to the relative silence on the question of
the limits of the preventive state.
The Supreme Court could have resisted this skewing in the
Hendricks case. After all, the Kansas Supreme Court framed its
decision in terms of substantive due process, 9 and the punishment issue came to the United States Supreme Court only by
way of its grant of Hendricks' cross-petition for certiorari. 6° Despite this state of affairs, the Court-both majority and dissentingJustices-still managed to be little more than perfunctory in
their treatment of the substantive due process issue. Thus, in
Hendricks, as in many other discussions of the limits of the preventive state, the punishment question tended to dominate and
to leave the mistaken impression that if the state is not punishing, it is not doing anything objectionable at all, constitutionally
speaking or otherwise.

See Steiker, Punishmentand Procedure,supra note 35, at 810.
Id. at 778-81 (canvassing recent discussions and scholarship on this question).
In reHendricks, 912 P.2d 129 (Kan. 1996).
"See Cross Petition for Certiorari, 116 S. Ct. 2522 (1996).

17
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What was the Court's treatment of Hendricks' substantive
due process claim? The claim on which Hendricks prevailed in
the Kansas Supreme Court was the argument that the involuntary, indefinite civil commitment of a dangerous person requires proof not only of dangerousness, but also of "mental
illness." 6'

Hendricks pointed out, correctly, that the United

States Supreme Court had not ever previously upheld civil
commitment schemes with criteria as vague and potentially
broad as Kansas' language of "mental abnormality" or "personality disorder." The majority made quick work of this argument.
Justice Thomas summarized the Court's precedents in a novel
and somewhat disingenuous way, stating, 'We have sustained
civil commitment statutes when they have coupled proof of
dangerousness with the proof of some additional factor, such as
a 'mental illness' or 'mental abnormality"' 6 --while failing entirely to observe that the precedents he cited in support of this
claim never endorsed the broad language of "mental abnormality," but instead used narrower (though not themselves uncontroversial) terms such as "mentally ill" or "mentally retarded.6 3
The point, of course, of limiting involuntary civil commitment
to those who are mentally ill is to reserve indefinite civil commitment to those who are truly incapable of choosing to understand or to comply with the law; those able to so choose should
have their liberty and their autonomy respected by being
treated as rational beings-and thus prosecuted pursuant to the
criminal law should they choose to do wrong. Justice Thomas
recognized this implicit rationale in his opinion in Hendricks,
finding that "the Kansas Act is plainly of a kind with these other
civil commitment statutes" because "it links [a finding of
dangerousness] to the existence of a 'mental abnormality' or
'personality disorder' that makes it difficult, if not impossible,
61
6

Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 138.
Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2080.

"See, e.g., Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 314-15 (1993) (Kentucky statute permitting
commitment of "mentally retarded" or "mentally ill" and dangerous individual); Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 366 (1986) (Illinois statute permitting commitment of
"mentally ill" and dangerous individual); Minnesota ex reL Pearson v. Probate Court
of Ramsey County, 309 U.S. 270, 271-72 (1940) (Minnesota statute permitting commitment of dangerous individual with "psychopathic personality").
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for the [committed] person to control his dangerous behavior. ''

4

Justice Thomas found Kansas' definition of "mental ab-

normality" to be "comparable" to the criteria set forth in other,
less controversial, civil commitment statutes.6
Unfortunately, there is not much basis for Justice Thomas'
sanguine conclusion that there is nothing particularly new or
unusual about Kansas' choice of statutory language. Although
experts do, of course, disagree about the scope of what constitutes "mental illness" or "mental retardation," there can be little
doubt that whatever the outer limits of these concepts are, they
do not come even close to the potential outer limits of the
much fuzzier concepts of "abnormality" or "disorder." At some
level, virtually all of those who choose to commit criminal acts,
especially those who commit unusually violent or otherwise abhorrent crimes (like sexual assaults on children) can be considered "abnormal." And the range of potential "disorders" is
likewise extraordinarily broad, even among mental health experts. 66 The concept of "mental illness," however defined, carries with it the legal connotation (although not the strict
definition) of the kind of mental state sufficient to impair cognition or volition so seriously as to render an individual legally
irresponsible and thus not properly subject to criminal punishment.67 Hence the need for non-criminal incapacitation and/or

61 Hendricks,

117 S. Ct. at 2080. This quote is followed by a citation to that section
of the Kansas statute defining "mental abnormality" as a "congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity which predisposes the person to
commit sexually violent offenses in a degree constituting such person a menace to
the health and safety of others." See id. (quoting KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(b)).
651&

For example, the same diagnostic manual cited by Justice Thomas to characterize Hendricks' pedophilia as a "serious mental disorder" also included descriptions of
"Caffeine-Induced Disorder," "Nicotine-Induced Disorder," and "Male Erectile Disorder." See The Supreme Court, 1996-Leading Cases, 111 HARV.L. REV. 259, 267 (1997)
(citing Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union et al. as Amici Curiae in Support
of Respondent at 13, Hendricks (Nos. 95-1649, 95-9075) (citing AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC
ASS'N DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 212, 244, 502 (4th
ed. 1994))).
67 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (excluding
criminal responsibility for someone suffering from a "mental disease or defect" such
that "he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness]
of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law").
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treatment. In contrast, the concepts of "abnormality" and "disorder" carry the legal connotation of circumstances that constrain choice to a much lesser degree.68 And since all of us are
constrained in our choices to some degree, the line between
normal and abnormal seems virtually impossible to draw. Are
drug addicts, alcoholics, smokers, or caffeine-ingesters suffering
from a "mental abnormality"? How about victims of childhood
sexual or other abuse? Or combat veterans with post-traumatic
stress disorder? Or women suffering from severe Pre-Menstrual
Syndrome? Or how about the now almost quaint concept of
"evil"-the category of "bad" people, who seem indifferent to
the suffering of others?
Justice Thomas and Justice Breyer both finesse this concern
in the same way: whether or not the statutory language of Kansas' "Sexually Violent Predator Act" strictly requires the degree
of volitional impairment sufficient for indefinite, involuntary
civil commitment, the record clearly demonstrated that Leroy
Hendricks suffered from just such a degree of impairment. He
testified himself that he was unable to "control the urge" to molest children when he became "stressed out" and that the only
way to be sure that he would not sexually abuse more children
'
Justice Thomas concluded
in the future would be "to die."O
that "[t]his admitted lack of volitional control ...

adequately

distinguishes Hendricks from other dangerous persons who are
perhaps more properly dealt with exclusively through criminal
proceedings." 0 Justice Breyer essentially reached the same conclusion-that Hendricks' particular kind of disorder and his detailed testimony about it sufficed to render the use of the statute
in his case constitutional. 71 Because Justice Thomas and Justice
6"SeeHendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2087 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (withholding judgment
on whether "mental abnormality" is "too imprecise a category to offer a solid basis for
concluding that civil detention is justified").
'9
Id at 2081 (citing to Record in the joint Appendix).
70
id.

7,As Justice Breyer noted:
Because (1) many mental health professionals consider pedophilia a serious
mental disorder; and (2) Hendricks suffers from a classic case of irresistible impulse, namely he is so afflicted with pedophilia that he cannot "control the urge"
to molest children; and (3) his pedophilia presents a serious danger to those
children; I believe that Kansas can classify Hendricks as "mentally ill" and "dan-
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Breyer and, indeed, all of the Justices on the Court (with the
possible exception of Justice Ginsburg) 72 could agree that Hendricks himself was properly subject to involuntary civil commitment, none of them found it necessary to tell us anything more
about anyone else. Given that the majority opinion, unlike the
dissent, endorsed not only Hendricks' incarceration, but the
statutory language as well, future policy-makers and courts will
remain at a loss to determine the degree of cognitive or volitional impairment necessary as a predicate to the indefinite incarceration of the dangerous.
Indeed, policy-makers might even question whether any degree of cognitive or volitional impairment will be held by the
Court to be a necessary predicate for the indefinite incarceration of the dangerous in the future, given Justice Thomas'
statement in his majority opinion that Hendricks' lack of volitional control adequately distinguishes him "from other dangerous persons who are perhaps more properly dealt with
exclusively through criminal proceedings.0 3 This tantalizing
"perhaps" leaves open the door for future decisions permitting
the incarceration of the dangerous, period-without any need
to restrict the class of those incarcerated to the special case of
the mentally ill. Surprisingly, not a single member of the fourperson dissent voiced concerns about either the majority's
equation of "mental abnormality" with "mental illness" or the
majority's apparent equivocation on the need for such an equation. Only Justice Kennedy, in his brief concurrence, flagged
this issue for the future in a short and vague clause, buried in
his paragraph-long conclusion:
On the record before us, the Kansas civil statute conforms to our precedents. If, however, civil confinement were to become a mechanism for
retribution or general deterrence, or if it were shown that mental abnormality is too imprecise a category to offer a solid basisfor concluding that civil deten-

tion isjustified, our precedents would not suffice to validate it.74
gerous" as this Court used those terms in Foucha [v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71
(1992)].
Id. at 2089 (BreyerJ., dissenting).
72See supranote 51.
7
'Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2081 (emphasis added).
71Id. at 2087 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
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Given the majority's conclusion that "mental abnormality" is not
any more problematic than "mental illness"75 and the dissent's
apparent lack of interest in this topic, it is unclear whether anyone except perhaps Justice Kennedy will be watching the future
application of Kansas' statute or other public policy developments as carefully as one might hope.
In addition to its surprising and distressing lack of clarity
about the degree of cognitive or volitional impairment necessary to permit the indefinite incarceration of the dangerous, the
Court was also utterly silent on many other issues surrounding
the proper use of civil commitment. Granted, the issue about
the meaning and permissibility of the language of "mental abnormality" was explicitly argued and briefed by the parties, and
there is thus particular reason to expect clarity on this point.
However, Justice Breyer seems clearly correct that the Kansas
Supreme Court also appeared to rest its substantive due process
analysis on the state's failure to provide Hendricks with treatment during his incarceration. 76 The majority opinion completely missed this point, addressing only the Kansas Supreme
Court's holding that the "mental abnormality" language was insufficient.77 While both the majority and the dissent seemed to
agree that treatment is not an indispensable feature of the civil
commitment of the mentally ill and dangerous, particularly
when no effective treatment of a individual is possible, they disagreed on what a state's obligation should be when such treatment is possible and is at least a plausible purpose of the
commitment.
Justice Breyer's dissenting position on this question is quite
clear,78 but Justice Thomas' position for the majority is impenetrable, largely because of Justice Thomas' apparent misreading
of the analysis of the court below. Justice Thomas did not apT5See supra note 61-63 and accompanying text.
"6 Id. at 2090 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing relevant portions of the Kansas Supreme Court's opinion).
7 See id. at 2079-81.
7' See id. at 2096 (BreyerJ., dissenting) ("[When a State decides offenders can be
treated and confines an offender to provide that treatment, but then refuses to provide it, the refusal to treat while a person is fully incapacitated begins to look punitive.").
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pear to realize (as Justice Breyer did) that the Kansas Supreme
Court was arguing that the purely incapacitative confinement of
the dangerous but treatable mentally ill violated the due process
clause. Rather, he understood the Kansas Supreme Court to be
arguing one of two other things. First, Justice Thomas understood the Kansas Court to be arguing that because there was no
effective treatment possible for sexually violent predators, the
state's purpose in indefinitely confining such offenders was to
inflict criminal punishment. He easily disposed of this argument of by maintaining"-without disagreement from Justice
Breyer's dissent-that incapacitation alone, quite apart from
rehabilitation, could suffice as a sufficient, non-punitive rationale for the civil commitment of the dangerous but untreatable
mentally ill.79

Second, and in the alternative, Justice Thomas

understood the Kansas Court to be arguing that although Hendricks' condition was treatable, Kansas' primary purpose in confining him was not treatment and in fact, the State of Kansas was
not providing him treatment, so that the state's purpose, once
again, must be punitive. In response to this perceived argument, Justice Thomas became quite vague. On the one hand,
he suggested that treatment need not be a state's "primary"
purpose in incarcerating the dangerous but treatable mentally
ill,8"' but he did not answer the question whether a state may
choose simply to segregate the dangerous mentally ill without
providing any treatment, even when such treatment is possible.82
On the other hand, Justice Thomas suggested, contrary to the
conclusions of the Kansas Supreme Court, that treatment actually was being provided. In support of this determination, however, Justice Thomas cited nothing in the record, but rather a
statement made by the Kansas Attorney General at oral argument and a statement made by a Kansas trial court judge at a
state habeas proceeding long after the date of Hendricks' own
commitment. 8' Thus, the majority opinion leaves hanging
79See

id. at 2083-84.

Id. at 2084.

8'Id. at 2084-85.
82id.
"Id. at 2085 & n.5 (citing Tr. of Oral Arg. 14-15, 16; App. 453-54); see id. at 2096-97

(BreyerJ., dissenting).
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much more than it resolves, in particular, two important questions: (1) to what degree must states intend to treat those whom
it confines as mentally ill and dangerous? and (2) to what degree must states actually follow through on treatment for those
whom it confines as mentally ill and dangerous (and what evidence will suffice to establish the existence of such treatment)?
Finally, a host of other issues about the use of civil commitment also remain hanging after the Court's decision in Hendricks. Justice Thomas' concluding paragraph to his "punishment" analysis reads as a laundry list of features that convinced
him (and the Court) that the Kansas statute was not so punitive
in purpose and effect so as to constitute punishment:
Where the State has "disavowed any punitive intent"; limited confinement to a small segment of particularly dangerous individuals; provided strict procedural safeguards; directed that confined persons be
segregated from the general prison population and afforded the same
status as others who have been civilly committed; recommended treatment if such is possible; and permitted immediate release upon a showing that the individual is no longer dangerous
84 or mentally impaired, we
cannot say that it acted with punitive intent.

Justice Thomas never tells us which of these things are necessary
or sufficient conditions for upholding a commitment statute as
non-punitive. Moreover, he does not answer (or even recognize
as an issue) the following question: Once a court has become
convinced that a commitment statute is not punitive, are any of
the features Justice Thomas lists necessary, as a matter of due
process, for a scheme of preventive incarceration? For example,
one could imagine a clearly preventive, non-punitive regime
that sweeps large numbers of potentially dangerous persons into
it (such as a regime in which "mental abnormality" includes alcoholism or drug abuse). Just how "small" a segment of the
population must be subject to confinement and just how "particularly dangerous" must this group be? Outside of the context
of determining whether the state is punishing (and even within
that context), no answers are forthcoming fromJustice Thomas'
analysis.
In sum, the majority opinion in Hendricks (and to a lesser
extent, the dissent as well) failed to use the case as an opportua'Id. at 2085.
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nity to clarify important issues regarding whether and what limits exist on the non-punitive use of civil confinement to deal
with dangerous individuals. The majority opinion assumed
away or finessed the key issues presented squarely in the Kansas
Supreme Court's opinion that it reversed, and the dissent failed
to challenge this circumspection except as it related to the dissent's own quite narrow analysis. Moreover, neither opinion
(nor Justice Kennedy's concurrence) made any effort to set the
Hendricks case in context: where does Kansas' sexually violent
predator law fit in the context of other laws upheld by the Supreme Court? Whereas the Court clearly saw analogies between
Kansas' statute and more general civil commitment laws, it had
nothing at all to say about how such statutes relate to broader
and more diverse efforts of the states to use incarceration prophylactically, such as in the treatment ofjuvenile delinquents or
the preventive pretrial detention of criminal defendants. Thus,
the light cast by Hendricks Court, dim and smoky as it already is,
illuminates only a very small comer of a very large area of the
law.
III. CHANDLER V. MLLER THE PROCEDURAL LIMITS
OF THE PREVENTIVE STATE

The Supreme Court's decision in Chandler struck down
under the Fourth Amendment a Georgia statute requiring candidates for certain state offices to submit to urinalysis drug testing before qualifying for nomination or election. The case is
notable partly because it is the only one of the four drug testing
cases to reach the Court in the past eight years to be found constitutionally infirm-and by an 8-1 margin, at that. 6 But the
Chandler decision is even more remarkable for the lack of guidance that it, like the Hendricks decision, offers lower courts and
future policy-makers-either in the narrow (but burgeoning)
85 Chandler

v.Miller, 117 S. Ct. 1295 (1997).

'6 See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) (upholding suspicionless drug testing of high school athletes); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von
Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (upholding suspicionless drug testing of certain Customs
Service employees); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989)
(upholding suspicionless drug and alcohol testing of railway employees involved in
train accidents and of those who violate particular safety rules).
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area of drug testing in the public sector or in the broader (and
also burgeoning) area of suspicionless searches and seizures
generally.
Hendricks and Chandler share a similar unsatisfying relationship to the law of the preventive state. In the case of Hendricks,
the use of involuntary "total" incarceration is normally restricted
to the sphere of substantive criminal law, as punishment for
criminal wrongdoing. The use of such incarceration as a preventive measure is thought to be a special case (heretofore generally restricted to the mentally incompetent). But although
Hendricks presented important issues about the scope of the
special case-and even about its specialness to begin with-the
Court's decision failed to illuminate those issues, and, indeed,
managed to leave them even murkier than they were before the
case arose. Similarly, in the case of Chandler,searches and seizures are normally thought to be reasonable investigative measures under the Fourth Amendment to the extent that there is
individualized suspicion of wrongdoing."7 Sometimes, this individualized suspicion is present in the classic form of a judicial
warrant supported by probable cause;8 at other times, probable
cause or articulable suspicion alone suffice to justify a state intrusion.m But suspicionless searches and seizures are exceptional under the Fourth Amendment-limited to a short (but
growing) list of circumstances, a subset of which has been
termed by the Court to involve "special needs."" Once again,
however, despite the opportunity in Chandler to illuminate the
meaning of "special" in a new context, the Supreme Court
managed to leave this area, too, in twilight.
17

This understanding of the Fourth Amendment is reiterated a number of times in

Chandler itself. See, e.g., Chandler,117 S. Ct. at 1301 ("To be reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment, a search ordinarily must be based on individualized suspicion of
wrongdoing.").
' See, e.g., CHA.IES H. WHrrEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIM NAL
PROCEDURE: AN ANALYSIS OF CASES AND CONCEPTS § 4.05a (3d ed. 1992) (subchapter on
"Determining Whether a Search or Seizure is Reasonable") (citing, inter alia, Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)).
89 See, e.g., id. §§ 4.05(b), (d), 11.03(a) (citing, inter alia, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968).
' See, e.g., id. §§ 11.03(b), 13 (citing, inter alia,NewJersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325
(1985)).
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The "special needs" justification for suspicionless searches
and seizures was born, ironically, in a case in which there was no
need to justify a suspicionless search and seizure. In New Jersey v.
9' the Court upheld a search by public school officials of
T.L. 0.,
a student suspected of smoking in the bathroom, even though
the search was conducted without a warrant or even probable
cause. The Court reasoned that in the special context of maintaining order in a school environment, school officials could,
consistent with the Constitution, conduct searches of students
when such searches are reasonable "under all the circumstances" 92 -a fairly freewheeling analysis, but one which would
necessarily include the initial justification for the search and the
relationship between the scope and intrusiveness of the search
to that initial justification. The Court observed that a search will
be justified initially "when there are reasonable grounds for
suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the student
has violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the
school.0 3 Given that the school officials in the case reasonably
suspected that a student, T.L.O., had been smoking in the bathroom, and their seizure of her and search of her purse were reasonably related in scope and intrusiveness to their disciplinary
concerns, the school officials' actions were "reasonable under
all of the circumstances" and thus not "unreasonable" under the
Fourth Amendment.94 The Court expressly declined to decide
"whether individualized suspicion is an essential element of the
reasonableness standard we adopt for searches by school
authorities."95
9'469 U.S. 325, 328 (1985).
912
See id. at 341.
9'Id. at 342.

" Id. at 343. The Court was quite specific about the justifications for the school officials' treatment of T.L.O. It concluded that the initial detention of T.L.O. and
search of her purse for cigarettes was justified by the suspicion that T.L.O. had been
smoking in the bathroom. Id. at 345. When this initial search revealed the presence
of rolling papers, a fuller search of T.L.O.'s purse was justified, reasoned the Court,
because there was then reasonable suspicion that marijuana was also present. Id at
347. And, indeed, marijuana and other evidence that T.L.O. had been selling the
drug was obtained from her purse and turned over by the school authorities to law
enforcement agents. See id.
9'Id. at 342 n.8.
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In a concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun authored the
phrase that has come to justify not only softening the constitutional preference for warrants and probable cause, but also
abandoning the need for any sort of individualized suspicion:
he recognized that "exceptional circumstances" may sometimes
arise "in which special needs, beyond the normal need for law
enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable .

. ,96

In the next dozen years, Justice

Blackmun's solo musings were invoked in half-dozen majority
opinions to justify (until Chandler) state actions otherwise incompatible with "traditional" Fourth Amendment analysis. 7
In two of these instances, the Court invoked the "special
needs" rubric to justify searches and seizures in which there was
some individualized suspicion, but no warrant or probable
cause. In O'Connorv. Ortega,8 a plurality of the Court concluded
that the government as employer could conduct work-related
searches of an employee's office without a warrant or probable
cause, given the special concerns implicated in the running of
an efficient government office. The plurality noted that this exception applied even when the government was searching for
evidence of employee misconduct, as long as the search was reasonable under all of the circumstances.9 Because the government employer in Ortega had some individualized suspicion of
wrongdoing by Ortega, the plurality reserved the question
"whether individualized suspicion is an essential element of the
standard of reasonableness . . ."100 intoning exactly the same

language that the Court had used in its T.L.O. opinion two years
earlier.
The same year as Ortega, the Court also decided Griffin v.
Wisconsin,101 which upheld a probation officer's search of the
Id. at 351 (Blackmun,J., concurring).
"SeeVernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989); National Treasury Employees Union v.
Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987); New York
v. Berger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987).
3 Ortega,480 U.S. at 721.
Id. at 722.
'0'Id. at 726.
'0' oiffin, 483 U.S. at 879-80.
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home of a probationer pursuant to a regulation authorizing
such searches when there exist "reasonable grounds" to believe
contraband is present. Once again, the Court found that the
state's interest in supervising probationers constituted a "special
need" that rendered unnecessary (indeed, problematic) either
reliance on a judicial warrant or use of a probable cause standard in the absence of a warrant. 10 2 But because the regulation
at issue called for some form of individualized suspicion ("reasonable grounds"), the Court once again avoided comment on
the question of the relationship between the "special needs" rubric and the possibility of completely suspicionless searches and
seizures.

Sandwiched in-between Ortega and Griffin, however, came a
case that used the "special needs" rubric for the first time to justify a search without any individualized suspicion at all. In New
York v. Burger,'0 4 the Court upheld a search, authorized by a state
regulatory statute, of an automobile junkyard, which revealed
evidence that stolen cars were being dismantled by the junkyard's owner. Relying on a series of earlier cases in which
searches of "closely regulated" businesses were subjected to less
demanding Fourth Amendment scrutiny,0 5 the Court concluded that such searches constituted situations of "special
need," citing Blackmun's T.L.O. concurrence. 6 The Burger
Court made clear that such searches could be conducted not
only without warrants, but also without any quantum of individualized suspicion at all.0 7 The reasonableness of such periId. at 876.
3 see id.

'02

'0'482 U.S. 691, 715-16 (1987).
10' See Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981) (upholding warrantless inspection of
stone quarry business by mine inspectors under the Mine Safety and Health Act of
1977); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972) (upholding warrantless inspection of the premises of a pawnshop operator who was licensed to sell certain weapons
pursuant to the Gun Control Act of 1968); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United
States, 397 U.S. 72, 77 (1970) (disapproving warrantless search of a catering business
on the narrow ground that the search was not authorized by the relevant federal
revenue statutes, but noting that the liquor industry was "long subject to close supervision and inspection").
106 New York, 482 U.S. at 702 (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 353
(1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring)).
107 id.
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odic suspicionless searches lay not in any particular reason to
believe that the subject of the search had committed some sort
of wrongdoing; rather, reasonableness could be established by
the existence of (1) a "substantial" state interest in regulating
the business at issue; (2) an inspection scheme that "reasonably
serves" the State's substantial regulatory interest; and (3) a
"constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant" that limits
the discretion of authorized inspectors in conducting the relevant searches.'08 The Court concluded that the constraints present in the statutory scheme at issue in Burger were adequate
given that the statute provided fair notice to the regulated business of the nature of the searches to which it could be subject
and the identity of authorized inspectors, in addition to limiting
the time, place, and scope of authorized inspections.1°9 The
Burgercase could be portrayed as simply a species of old wine in
a new bottle, as merely ratifying and recasting as a "special
need" the already existing category of "regulatory searches."
But Burger raised two related, troubling questions-one about
the nature of the old category of regulatory searches and one
about the new rubric of special needs-that have yet to be answered today, ten years later.
The Burger case exposed the problematic and potentially
expansive borderland between the supposedly separate categories of "regulation" and "criminal law enforcement." The New
York statutory scheme implicated in the Burger case required
operators ofjunkyards to, inter alia, obtain licenses, display their
registration numbers on all business documentation and on vehicles and parts that pass through their businesses, maintain
"police books" recording the acquisition and disposition of motor vehicles and vehicle parts, and make these books available
for inspection by the police or agents of the Department of Motor Vehicles.110 Failure to comply with these provisions was punishable not only by loss of license or civil fines, but by criminal
penalties as well."' So, when the police came marching, uninId.at 702-03.
,o'
Id. at 711-12.
1o Id. at 704 (citing N.Y. VEH. & TRMr. LAW-§§ 415-a5 (a), (b) (McKinney 1986)).
..Id. at 704-05.

798
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vited, into Burger's junkyard, looking for his registration number and demanding to see his police book, were they acting as
agents of the regulatory state or as criminal law enforcement
agents?
The Burger Court attempted to explain that administrative
statutes and penal laws "may have the same ultimate purpose of
remedying the social problem" at issue, but that regulation is
distinct from law enforcement in that the former "set[s] forth
rules to guide an operator's conduct of the business and allow[s] government officials to ensure that those rules are followed," whereas the latter emphasizes "the punishment of
individuals for specific acts of behavior."

2

This verbal distinc-

tion is not particularly helpful, to say the very least. After all,
one could easily say that the very purpose of the criminal law is
to "set forth rules to guide ... conduct" and to "allow govern-

ment officials to ensure that those rules are followed." And it is
equally obvious that "punishment of individuals for specific
acts" is central to many regulatory regimes. Perhaps the Court
was trying to suggest that deterrence of wrongdoing through
close monitoring is different from deterrence through punishment after the fact. But once again, close monitoring deters
only because the person or persons monitored know that punishment will follow if the monitoring reveals wrongdoing. Thus,
the Court's facile distinction does not come close to clearly defining the border between regulation and law enforcement necessary for any "regulated business" exception to ordinary Fourth
Amendment analysis.
This borderline problem became even more pronounced
once the Supreme Court began to conceive of the "regulated
business" exception under the rubric of "special needs." The
earlier "closely regulated business" cases upon which the Burger
opinion relied had been predicated almost exclusively on the
decreased expectation of privacy traditionally entertained by
owners of such businesses. 3 But once the Burger Court turned
to the rubric of "special needs, beyond the normal need for law
enforcement," it became even more crucial for the Court to dis1

Id. at 704.

...
See supra note 105.
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tinguish "normal" law enforcement (which would be subject to
traditional Fourth Amendment constraints) from the "special
needs" of the regulatory state (which would not). When the
regulatory state shares with the criminal law the same overarching goal of promoting compliance with the law, and seeks to use
both criminal sanctions as one of its regulatory strategies and
police officers as one of its authorized inspectors-all of which
was true in Burger-it becomes very difficult to separate the
"normal" from the "special" case.
This difficulty is more than academic, because it represents
the difficulty of containing the "special needs" exception to
manageable proportions-of maintaining it as "exceptional" at
all. This concern became more apparent, though it was not re-4
solved, in the case of Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz,1
in which the Supreme Court upheld against Fourth Amendment challenge a program of suspicionless stops and brief inspections of all vehicles passing through "sobriety checkpoints"
established on public roads. The program, which was created
and implemented by the Michigan State Police, was designed to
enforce the state's criminal prohibition of driving under the influence of alcohol. For the first time, it was a criminal defendant
who invoked the Court's "special needs" cases, arguing that the
enforcement of drunk driving laws fell, if anything at all did,
within the category of "the normal need for criminal law enforcement" and thus that law enforcement agents should have
to demonstrate either probable cause or reasonable suspicion
before executing a warrantless stop of an automobile. 15 The
Supreme Court, however, declined to use Sitz as a vehicle for
elaborating on the distinction between the "normal" and "special" needs for law enforcement; instead, the Court narrowed its
focus and simply relied upon two earlier cases to deal with the
drunk driving checkpoints at issue in the case. First, the Court
noted that it had already ruled that the Constitution permitted
law enforcement agents to conduct suspicionless stops of motorists at fixed checkpoints near the border in order to detect the
"' 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
. See id. at 449-50 (citing National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489
U.S. 656 (1989)).
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entry of illegal aliens.1 16 Second, the Court invoked the "test"
promulgated in Brown v. Texas" 7 to the effect that, in general,

determining the constitutionality of "seizures that are less intrusive than a traditional arrest... involves a weighing of the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to
which the seizure advances the public interest, and the severity
of the interference with individual liberty."" 8
What the Sitz Court did not seem to realize, however, is that
the test that it adopted involved exactly the same freewheeling
balancing that the Court employs under the "special needs" rubric. Should we understand Sitz to say that we can resort to this
inclusive balancing either under the "special needs" rubric or
when evaluating seizures less intrusive than arrest? Or should
we understand Sitz to say that the "special needs" cases and the
checkpoint cases are just subsets of the general category of cases
in which searches and seizures are reasonable because the government interests at stake outweigh the private interests at
stake? In other words, does the word "special" denote something unusual about the nature of the government's interest, or
does it simply reflect the relative balance of the government's
interest and the individual's interest in a particular case?
It is against this backdrop that the Supreme Court confronted the latest "special needs" case-Chandlei's challenge to
the Georgia statute requiring that candidates for certain state
offices submit to drug testing in the absence of any individualized suspicion." 9 Of course, Chandlerwas not the first drugtesting case to reach the Court. The Court had previously approved suspicionless testing for drugs and alcohol of railway
employees who were involved in certain train accidents or who
had violated certain safety rules, 20 suspicionless drug testing of
Customs Service employees applying for certain transfers or

..See id. (citing United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976)).
117 443 U.S. 47, 51-53 (1979)
(holding that the Fourth Amendment requires the
police to have individualized suspicion before they may stop individuals and require
them to identify themselves, even in high crime areas).
18 Id. at 50-51 (citations omitted).
"9 Chandler

v.Miller, 117 S. Ct. 1295 (1997).
SeeSkinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
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promotions, and suspicionless drug testing of certain high
school athletes.
But each of these previous cases simply upheld the testing on the particular facts presented to the Court;
in none of these cases did the Court make any attempt to set out
the necessary or sufficient conditions for a constitutionally
sound program of involuntary suspicionless drug testing in the
public sector, much less the precise contours of the "special
needs" exception more generally. Chandlerpresented the most
recent and most compelling opportunity for the Court to address these issues, given that the Court, for the first time, found
a drug-testing regime-or any governmental interest framed as
a "special need"--to lie outside of the "special needs" rubric.
But the Court in Chandler only perpetuated the confusion
already present in Fourth Amendment doctrine. Acknowledging that the earlier drug testing cases and the "special needs"
rubric were the relevant touchstones for its analysis, the majority
opinion, authored by Justice Ginsburg, noted that Georgia's
plan for administering the drug tests-in the privacy of a medical office at a time chosen by the political candidate-was relatively non-invasive.1
Thus, the Court construed the central
question at issue to be whether the state of Georgia had demonstrated a "special need" that was "substantial-important
enough to override the individual's acknowledged privacy interest, sufficiently vital to suppress the Fourth Amendment's normal requirement of individualized suspicion." 24 This framing of
the question managed to leave unresolved precisely the problematic issue raised by Sitz25 about the limits of the "special
needs" rubric: are the state's needs "special" because they are of
a certain nature or type (i.e., regulatory as opposed to criminal)
or are they "special" simply because they are important enough
to outweigh the individual liberty interests infringed by the
state's action?

1

SeeNational Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989).

' Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
'" ChandLer,117 S. Ct. at 1303.
124 id.

'2 Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
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Justice Ginsburg's majority opinion gives very few clues
about how the Court should or will answer this question. On
the one hand, Justice Ginsburg seems to affirm that traditional
Fourth Amendment analysis is the norm: "The Fourth Amendment... generally bars officials from undertaking a search or
seizure absent individualized suspicion." 28 Moreover, she goes
on to insist that suspicionless searches and seizures are not only
exceptional, but rare: she characterizes the category of constitutionally permissible suspicionless searches as "closely guarded"
and in particular, she describes the Court's earlier decision in
Von Raab (upholding suspicionless drug testing of certain Cusa decision opening broad
toms Service employees) as "[h] ardly
27
searches."
suspicionless
for
vistas
On the other hand, however, Justice Ginsburg's majority
opinion places few clear limits on the type of government interest that can be deemed "special" so as to be subject to the
Court's more free-wheeling and undoubtedly more deferential
balancing analysis instead of traditional Fourth Amendment
limitations. The Court is emphatic that interests that are merely
"symbolic" and not "real"--as the Court deemed Georgia's interests to be in Chandler-will not be deemed "special" governmental needs. 2 8

But the Court doesn't explain how lower

courts or policy-makers should identify "real" interests. While
the Court criticizes the State of Georgia for not demonstrating
that a problem of drug use by state officials existed prior to the
enactment of its drug testing requirement, the majority opinion
also notes that such a demonstration is "not in all cases necessary to the validity of a testing regime."'1

And while the Court

criticizes the State of Georgia for enacting a drug testing
scheme unlikely to detect and deter much illegal drug use (because the candidates subject to testing could pick the date of
the test themselves well ahead of time), Justice Rehnquist, the
sole dissenter, seems to have a point when he notes that a better
26 Chandler,117 S. Ct. at 1298.
7 Id. at 1304 (construing National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 484
U.S. 656 (1989)).
328 Id. at 1304-05.
2

Id. at 1303.
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designed scheme would no doubt be much more intrusive on
liberty interests.' 0
The only other definition that the Chandler Court offers for
the "special needs" rubric-aside from its insistence that the asserted governmental interest be "important" and "real"-is that
the category embraces "concerns other than crime detection."'3' At
first glance, this restriction seems like a helpful qualifier, able to
distinguish between the "normal" and "special" needs of law enforcement. But once one takes into account the interests of the
preventive as well as the punitive state, almost every law enforcement initiative can seem profoundly Janus-faced-looking
both backward to crime detection and forward to crime prevention. Take Sitz 32 as an example. The defendants argued forcefully that the use of sobriety checkpoints constituted classic law
enforcement of the crime detection sort-meant to catch those
driving under the influence of alcohol and subject them to
criminal punishment.3 3 But one could also argue that such
roadblocks constitute a forward-looking deterrent-surely, their
existence would make people think twice before getting behind
the wheel of a car while intoxicated, knowing that they would be
much more likely to be caught. Ultimately the Court ducked
this issue, upholding the checkpoints without opining about the
"specialness" (or lack thereof) of the state's asserted interest. 34
But the ChandlerCourt's cryptic, almost throw-away definition of
"special needs" as concerns "other than crime detection"'' 3 is of
little help in classifying Sitz-or a myriad of other possible law
enforcement initiatives.
The law enforcement initiatives left unsettled by the obscurity of the Chandleropinion include not only programs of suspicionless drug testing, but also other schemes that likewise lie at
the intersection of the punitive and the preventive state. For
example, consider the rapid development of DNA databases or
' Id. at 1307 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 1301 (emphasis added).
"'Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
See id. at 447-48.
"'Id.at 455.
. Chandler,117 S. Ct. at 1301.
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"banks" in virtually every state, which until now has been limited
to collecting DNA information from convicted felons, 36 who
have long been held to have reduced expectations of privacy
under the Fourth Amendment.1

37

Under what circumstances

may the federal or state governments collect and use such valuable and accurate information from citizens other than convicts? On the one hand, one could portray the collection and
use of this information as classic "crime detection" in that DNA
tests often permit the police to identify after the fact the perpetrator of a prior, discrete crime. On the other hand, however,
one could argue that DNA databases are primarily prophylactic
in their deterrent effect upon people who might otherwise be
disposed to commit crimes with the hope of "getting away with
it." Does the collection of DNA information constitute a "spe38
cial need," in which case it might, under some circumstances,
be done in the absence of individualized suspicion? Or is it subject to the usual presumption in favor of individualized suspicion? 3 9

And even if we could know with more certainty when the
"special needs" analysis applies, the Chandler Court leaves the
"6 See Gisela Ostwald, Youth No Bar to Genetic Fingerprintingin the U.S., DEUTSCHE
PRESSE-AGENTUR, May 4, 1998 (explaining that 49 of the 50 states now allow the police

to store the DNA fingerprints of criminals); Peter Finn, Revolution Underway in Use of
DNA Profiles; Bid to Link U.S. Databanks is Crime-Solving Edge, WASH. POsT, Nov. 16,
1997, at B4 (noting that Virginia was the first state to create a DNA databank in
1989).
" See, e.g., Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948) ("Lawful incarceration
brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a
retraction justified by the considerations underlying our penal system."), quoted in
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545-46 (1979) (dealing in particular with limitations on
inmates' privacy rights).
"' Circumstances that might favor the widespread collection of DNA information
under a "special needs" analysis might include, for example, the ability to collect such
information from a fingernail clipping or a hair sample, instead of by drawing blood
(given that these former methods would diminish the physical intrusiveness of the extraction of the information), or the ability to shield from disclosure other, private information (such as susceptibility to certain diseases) encoded in DNA (which would
diminish the degree of intrusion into personal privacy).
,'9 The same questions could be applied to other suspicionless searches and seizures made possible by new technology, such as thermal imaging, widespread video
surveillance, and internet eavesdropping. See generally Symposium: Crime and Technology, 10 HARv.J.L. & TECH. 383 (1997).
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"special needs" balancing test as wide-open and free-wheeling as
possible. How much danger must the government be seeking to
combat? In the drug testing context, the Court approved both
the drug testing of railroad employees4 (who obviously could
cause massive property damage and loss of life if under the influence of drugs or alcohol) and the drug testing of high school
athletes (whose danger to others on the playing field seems less
in the way of a "surpassing safety interest"). What kind of proof
of a pre-existing problem must be shown?141 How unintrusive
must the government's conduct be?42

Of course, one of the

great virtues of a balancing analysis is to eschew rules and to
consider the unique circumstances of each situation. But one
of the great vices of a balancing analysis is its lack of predictability, a lack that is particular dangerous in the context of law enforcement.'4 3
This lack of predictability is reflective of the larger problem
inherent in both the Chandlerand the Hendricks opinions. Despite the fact that the divisions on the Court as well as the identities of the opinion writers were quite different in the two cases,
both majorities failed in strikingly similar ways to see the discrete problems before them as related to, indeed emblematic
of, a larger discourse that more and more urgently needs careful engagement. This failure may well be the result of an often
laudable cautiousness in decision-crafting, a self-conscious effort
to narrow the focus to that and only that which must necessarily
be decided within a given case. But it is also a virtue ofjudicial
craftsmanship, particularly at the Supreme Court level, to anticipate the ways in which a particular decision will affect future
particular cases and legal discourse more generally. For better
40

Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 634 (1989).

"' See supra text accompanying note 129 (remarking that the ChandlerCourt castigates the State of Georgia for failing to document a problem of drug-use by government officials while at the same time it notes that such documentation is not always
necessary to survive a "special needs" analysis).
142The taking of blood approved in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489
U.S. 602 (1989), and the searching of homes approved in Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483
U.S. 868 (1987), are fairly serious intrusions into personal security.
"3 See Steiker, Second Thoughts, supra note 36, at 854-55 (arguing that a "reasonableness" balancing test is dangerous in the law enforcement context because it fails
to adequately contain police discretion).
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or worse, the Court will not be able to avoid the implications for
and questions about the limits of the preventive state raised by
Hendricks and Chandlerfor long.
IV. THE FUTURE OF THE PREVENTWE STATE?
The central question that the Court must soon engage in a
concerted fashion is whether and to what extent the state's attempt to prevent or prophylactically deter (as opposed to investigate) crime and to incapacitate or treat (as opposed to
punish) wrongdoers insulates the state's actions from the limits
the law would otherwise place on the investigative/punitive
state. The Constitution places limits on the punitive state because of special fears about state abuse both of law enforcement's monopoly on the legitimate use of force and of the
justice system's ability "to harness the power of blame" through
criminal punishment. 4 4 These fears are especially heightened
when the state moves, as it often does in the criminal context,
against a discrete and targeted enemy. Are there any special
justifications that would argue for cabining the power of the
preventive state? If so, for cabining it in what respects?
I mean to raise rather than to answer these questions here.
But the general sorts of concerns raised by the preventive state
are not so much focused on the possibility of political or discriminatory oppression of known enemies, although preventive
institutions could surely be adapted to such ends. (Think, for
example, of the use of the mental institution for political dissidents in the former Soviet Union.) Rather, the biggest concern
raised by the growth of the preventive state is likely the fear of a
"Big Brother" state-a government even more deeply insinuated
into "private" life than it already is. Preventive state actions like
the incarceration of the dangerous or the implementation of
suspicionless searches and seizures give the state much greater
power over and much greater knowledge about its citizenry.
The possibility that developing technology will enhance the
state's ability to collect data about its citizens and to conduct

' See Steiker, Punishment and Procedure,supranote 35, at 809.
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surveillance of them in both real and "virtual" space makes such
concerns more credible and compelling.
On the other hand, the state's enhanced power over and
knowledge about its citizens could have many beneficial effects,
particularly in the reduction of crime, social disorder, and personal insecurity. How much does or should the state's benign
intentions in its use of such power or its pursuit of such knowledge count in the constitutional (or policy) balance? One answer is the famous Brandeis quote (offered by Justice Ginsburg
in striking down Georgia's suspicionless drug testing program):
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect lib-

erty when the Government's purposes are beneficent.

Men born to

freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evilminded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding. ' 4e

Whether or not Brandeis' answer is right or complete, we need
answers to the questions posed above. Few courts or scholars
have offered such answers (or even recognized the questions). 146
It is time that more do so.
In that spirit, I offer this essay as a "Foreword" in three distinct senses. It is, of course, an introduction to this issue of The
Journalof CriminalLaw & Criminology, an issue that offers a careful and comprehensive discussion of the relevant criminal law
decisions of the Supreme Court's 1996 Term. It is also a preview of topics that I myself plan to continue thinking and writing about in the future. And, finally, I hope that it is a
"Foreword" in the sense of a forerunner of other words, by
courts and scholars alike, on the important questions-which
" Chandler v. Miller, 117 S. Ct. 1295, 1305 (1997) (citing Olmstead v. United

States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (BrandeisJ.)).
"6There are some exceptions: a few scholars have begun to engage the question of
the relationship between the civil and criminal state, particularly in regard to the use
of preventive incarceration. See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson, Foreword: The Criminal-Civil
Distinction and DangerousBlameless Offenders, 83 J. CraM. L. & CRIWNOLOGY 693 (1993)
(arguing in favor of the civil incarceration of the dangerous in order to preserve the
blaming function of the punitive state for the blameworthy); Stephen J. Schulhofer,
Two Systems of Social Protection:Comments on the Civil-CriminalDistinction, with Particular
Reference to Sexually Violent PredatorLaws, 7J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 69, 85 (1996) (arguing for limits on the civil incarceration of the dangerous because "civil deprivation
of liberty is permissible only as a gap-filler, to solve problems that the criminal process
cannot address").
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are being raised today in a myriad of contexts and guisesabout the limits of the preventive state.

